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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY   
 
In many developing coastal countries, wild fish stocks have been overexploited. Moreover, fishing 
techniques have evolved which have exacerbated the problem of stock depletion. In Ghana, some 
inshore fishers acquire and illegally use light attraction equipment to improve their efficiency. This 
equipment includes a fire torch, pressure kerosene lamp, gas light lamp, and battery or generator 
assisted incandescent lamp. Since this crime is committed repeatedly until detection, this study 
extends the fishery crime model of Akpalu (2008) to investigate the determinants of the non-
compliance with the regulation.  
 
Two empirical models have been estimated: a Logit model to investigate the factors determining 
violation of the regulation and Maximum Entropy Leuv n Estimator (MELE) (i.e. a semi-
parametric model), due to limited data on violators, to estimate the severity of violation of the 
regulation. We found that increased risk of punishment (i.e. probability of detection) and severity 
of punishment (i.e. penalty) decrease the violation rate and older skippers are less likely to violate 
the regulation. The impact of the probability of detection is stronger than that of the penalty and 
the age of the skipper has the strongest impact on the violation rate. Individual discount rates, 
number of dependents, perceived social pressure and unfairness of the regulation positively affect 
the violation rate. For those fishers who violate th regulation, the investment in the light attraction 
equipment, which is a proxy for severity of violation, negatively affects the probability of detection 
and penalty. On the other hand, the severity of violation positively affects individual discount rate, 
fishing effort, social pressure and the age of the skipper, and the extent to which the fisher believes 
the regulation will protect the stock.  
 
The policy implications are as follows. First, fishers could be discouraged from violating the 
regulation or those who violate will decrease the severity of violation if the enforcement effort 
and/or the penalty increases.  Second, since we found discount rates to be generally high, which 
could be an indication that the fishers are credit constrained due to imperfections in the credit 
market, any policy that addresses such imperfections n the credit market is likely to reduce the 
violation of the regulation. Third, since younger fishers are more likely to violate the regulation 
than the older ones but among those who violate the regulation, the older ones have higher severity 
of violation of the regulation than the younger ones, the fishery department should direct more 
resource to targeting the middle-aged fishers. Finally, the fishery department should direct 
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1.  Introduction 
From the late 19th century and early 20th century, Ghana’s population increased 
considerably triggering the demand for fish. The fishery sector responded to the increased 
demand by undergoing some considerable changes. These include the introduction of 
improved fishing gears such as the purse seine net a d synthetic netting materials, 
outboard motors, and improvement in fish processing a d storage facilities (Koranteng, 
1992). Presently, artisanal and semi-industrial fishing are the most important direct and 
indirect employment generating activity in the entire coastal zone of the country.  It has 
been estimated, for example, that the artisanal fishery sub-sector supports about 1.5 
million people (FAO, 1998) and of the total marine annual fish catch, between 70% and 
80% come from the artisanal fisheries (FAO, 1998), with the rest coming from the semi-
industrial and industrial fishing vessels. Since thresource is essentially managed as an 
open access with some gear restriction, the over-capitalization of the artisanal and semi-
industrial fishery has eventually resulted in over ha vesting of the nation’s inshore wild 
fish stock. For example, after a sharp increase in art sanal catch per boat from 27.4 to 35.3 
between 1989 and 1992, it declined from 1992 through 1995 although fishing techniques 
improved and the number of crew per boat also increased. The most recent data available 
show that the lowest figure for the catch per boat w s recorded in 2001 (Mills et al., 2004 
cited in Akpalu, 2008). 
 
In spite of the declining average size and quantity of catch due to the overcapitalization, 
fishing techniques have evolved to the use of destructive fishing gears, which is further 
exacerbating the problem of over harvesting.  The light attraction, which is mainly used by 
purse seine gear (i.e. inshore/semi-industrial vessels), is the technique that involves the use 
of artificial light in the night when the moon is out to attract and aggregate fish so that with 
any given effort, more fish could be harvested. Examples of the source of light include a 
fire torch, pressure kerosene lamp, gas light lamp, and battery or generator assisted 
incandescent lamp (Bannerman and Quartey, 2004). According to Bannerman and Quartey 
(2004), catch of small pelagic fishes increased from 450 metric tons in 1999-2000 to 7000 
metric tons in 2001-2003 when the use of light attrac ion equipment intensified. With 
fishing efforts exceeding sustainable levels in thesector coupled with the use of 
destructive fishing gears such as the light aggregation, it is likely that the inshore fishery 
may eventually collapse. This poses a serious threat to food security and sustainable 
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livelihoods which goes beyond the fishing communities.  To reverse or halt the over 
fishing, it is imperative to investigate the reasons for non-compliance with the regulations 
and then formulate policies accordingly.  
 
In the fisheries economics literature, the theoretical model of crime developed by Becker 
(1968), Ehrlich (1973) and Block and Heineke (1975) have been used to empirically 
investigate determinants of fishery crimes. However, as noted by Akpalu (2008) this 
model which has been applied to closed areas, quantity restriction, or gear restrictions has 
considered a situation where the potential violator faces a one-period decision problem of 
maximizing an expected utility1. For crimes that are committed repeatedly, such as the 
acquisition and use of light attraction or illegal nets, the potential offender considers the 
stream of benefits obtainable from the crime and therefore has to be modelled as dynamic 
model, which involves discounting. In this paper a dynamic deterrence model of crime is 
presented following Akpalu (2008) and tested with data from inshore fishers in Ghana. It 
is noteworthy that although the theoretical framework f r this paper draws on Akpalu’s 
work, this paper extends the model to address a different regulation with potentially 
different violators (i.e. different sample is considered). Factors such as individual discount 
rate, perceived probability of detection, expected fine, age of the fisher, social pressure, 
fairness of the regulation, among other possible factors have been investigated. The 
findings, which are interesting and conforms to theoretical predictions show that 
perceived instantaneous conditional probability of detection and expected fine are 
negatively related to the decision to violate and the severity of violation (of which the 
replacement cost of the light attraction equipment is used as a proxy)2. Secondly, the 
individual discount rate and perceived social pressure are positively related to both the 
decision to violate and the severity of violation. Thirdly, while younger fishers are more 
likely to violate the regulation, the older cohorts among the younger fishers have higher 
severity of violation implying that the fisheries department must target younger adults. 
Furthermore the fishers who strongly agree that the light attraction regulation is unfair or 
                                                
1 Examples of the static crime model applied to fisheries are Sutinen and Andersen, 1985; Anderson and Lee, 
1986; Sutinen and Hannessey, 1986; Furlong, 1991; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1994; Charles et al., 1999; 
Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Hatcher et al., 2000; Hatcher, 2005; and Chavez and Salgado, 2005. 
2 Although the severity of use may also depend on the frequency of use, the fishers were reluctant to provide 
that additional information during the pilot visit so this information was not obtained in the survey. 
Moreover, since the fishers do not keep proper records there was also a problem of accuracy in recalling this 
information.    
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have relatively more dependents are more likely to violate the regulation. On the other 
hand, for the fishers who violate the regulation, the severity of violation increases with the 
strength of the conviction that the regulation is intended to protect the stock. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The theoretical model is presented in section 
2 followed by some empirical models in section 3. Section 4 has the data description and 
discusses the results and section 5 presents the conclusions of the paper.  
 
2.  The Theoretical model 
The theoretical framework for this research is a dynamic model of fishery crime, which 
follows Akpalu (2008). Consider a standard Schaefer model in which the level of harvest 
perfectly correlates with the level of effort for any given level of stock. Further, assume 
that the catchability coefficient is a function of the use of light attraction so that with any 
given level of stock and effort, the more fish is caught the more the severity of use of the 
light equipment.  Suppose that a potential violator i  f the light attraction regulation has a 
profit function given by ( ( ) , , , , )i it it t xl E x k pπ α , where ( tx ) is a given stock  within the 
management area; ( )itlα  is the catchability coefficient which is a function f the severity 
of use of the light attraction equipment (i.e.l ); itE  is an index of fishing effort; k  is a 
common fixed cost of harvest which is independent of the level of use of the light 
attraction; and xp  is price per kilogram of harvest which is assumed to be constant over 
time. If the fisher does not use the light attraction, then the catchability coefficient is 
normalised to 1, and it is greater than 1 if the fisher uses it. 
 
The fishery under consideration is organized as an open access with some gear restrictions 
and is characterized by unpredictable seasonal upwelling that produces plankton, on which 
the fish feed (Akpalu, 2008). It is therefore impossible for fishers to predict the trend of the 
fish stocks. We suppose for simplicity, but without losing generality, that a fisher’s best 
forecast of future stock is the present stock and therefore takes the stock as given. It is also 
noteworthy that in an open access fishery, the stock has no capitalized value to an 
individual fisher. The general specification of the profit function for the fisher, if he 
violates the regulation, is   
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( ( ) , , , , ) ( )i i i x x i i il E k p c p l E x cE kπ α α= − − ,                      (1) 
 
where icE  is individual specific cost function for the harvest (the time subscripts have 







 and (0) 1α = . On the other hand, if the fisher does not use the light attraction 
equipment, his profit is (1, , , , )i i x x i iE k p c p E x cE kπ = − − . Assume that the fisherman is 
not a pure profit-maximizing agent but derives disutility (say feels guilty) directly from 
using the illegal equipment and the disutility is scaled by a vector of the fisherman’s socio 
economic characteristics and perception variables (Φ ) so that ( , )iz l Φ  defines the function 
(Akpalu, 2008). The utility function may then be re-stated as  
 
         ( ( ) , , , , , , ) ( ( ), , , , , ) ( ; )
i i i
i i i x i xu l E x k p c l E x k p c z lα π αΦ = + Φ% ,                   (2)  
 
where 0ilz <  and (.)α%  incorporates the disutility from fishing illegally.  By implication, if 
the fisherman does not violate the regulation then (1, , , , , , )i i i xu E x k p wΦ , with (0) 0
iz =  
by some normalization.  
 
If a fisher is caught using the illegal equipment he receives a fine defined by the 
expression ( ) ( )i i i i iF l f f l= + % , where if , the perceived fine, is the product of a fixed fine 
and each fisherman’s perceived probability of being fi ed given that the illegal fishing 
activity is detected (iq ) (i.e. 
i
i if q f=  ); and ( )if l%  (with 0lf >% ) is the expected penalty, 
which depends on the severity of violation (i.e. seizure of the light attraction equipment). 
As in Akpalu (2008) and Davis (1988), suppose that each violator does not know the exact 
time the detection will occur but only some probability distribution of the time of detection 
denoted by ( , )i ig l t , where the probability that detection would have occurred at time t  in 
the future is the cumulative density function (cdf), ( )iG t . The expected present value of the 
penalty can then be stated as 
0




∫  and the resultant illegal-legal two-
segment dynamic problem is  
 





( ( ), , , , , , ) 1 ( )
( ( ), , , , , )
(1, , , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , )
i
i
i i x iti
i x i
i i x i i i i i
u l E x k p c G t
V l E x k p c e dt




 Φ − + =  
Φ −  
∫% ,      (3)     
 
where (.)iV  is the value-function and iδ  is the individual benefit discount rate which is  
assumed to be positive. The illegal fisher will maximize profit from the illegal catch until 
it is detected but after the detection he will have to maximize profit from only legal 
harvesting3. Furthermore define the probability that the illegal activity will be detected 
within a very small interval of time t  given that it had not been detected in the past as 









. Let ( ) ( )i i i ip l p p l= + %  where ip  is exogenous and 
could be influenced by increased enforcement effort. Moreover if il  is assumed to be time 
invariant and the fisher commits to some optimum level of effort over time, then 
( )(1 ( ))
ip l t
iG t e
−− =  and ( )( , ) ( )i p l tig l t p l e
−= . Equation (4) is obtained if the expression for 
the probability distribution (i.e. ( , )ig l t ) is substituted into the objective function and all 




( ( ) , , , , , , ) (1, , , , , , ) ( ) (1, , , , , , )i i i i ii i i x i i x i ii i i x
i
i i i





Φ − Φ − Φ= +
+
%
  (4) 
 
Equations (4) could be maximized with respect to il  (the variable of interest) and iE . Note 
that the first and second terms on the right hand side of the equation are the expected 
returns from fishing illegally and fishing legally, respectively. If the first term is positive 
then it is worthwhile to invest in the illegal equipment (Chang and Ehrlich, 1985; Akpalu, 
2008). Also, as noted by Akpalu (2008), the importance of the discount rate in violation 
stems from the fact that if il  affects ( )
i
ip l  then il  affects future profits and the current 
value of this effect depends on iδ . The following signs are easily obtainable from the 
Hessian matrix derived from equation (4) (see Akpalu, 2008 for similar derivations): 
                                                
3 It is supposed that offenders do not repeat the crime after they are caught because as noted by Akpalu 
(2008) the inshore fishermen are known to live in abject poverty and may not be able to reinvest in the 
equipment if it is seized.  
 


























. Furthermore, in reality the optimal effort (i.e. *iE ) 
precedes the investment in light attraction equipment, hence *il  depends on 
*
iE .  Note that 
the specific functional forms of the utility function has not been specified. Therefore, we 
can only characterize the relationship between the supply of violation and its possible 
determinants. Since xp , w , k  and c  are not individual specific but apply to all fishermen, 
these parameters will be captured by the intercept of the regression. Second, from the 
specification of the catch function, the severity of vi lation will be a function of the level 
of stock and since the stock level does not vary acoss the fishers, it is not an argument in 
the empirical model. Finally, the socio-economic variables in the vector iΦ  includes the 
fisher’s age ( iA ), wealth ( iW ), whether the fisher belongs to a credit association or not 
( iCR ), the number of dependents the fisher has (iDP ). The perception variables are the 
fisher’s perceived social pressure (iSP ) and fairness of the regulation ( iFR ) (see Kuperan 
and Sutinen, 1994; Sutinen and Kuperan, 1999; Hatcher et al., 2000; Akpalu, 2008). From 
equation (4), the general form of the supply of violati n function is specified as 
 
( )* * , , , , ( , , , ; , )i i i i i i i i i i i il l p E f A W DP CR SP FRδ= Φ ,             (5) 
 
It is hypothesized that, for example, increasing social pressure, measured by the perception 
of the proportion of fishermen who violate the regulation would motivate a fisherman to 
increase the severity of violation. Similarly, a fisherman who is more inclined to perceive 
the regulation to be unfair is likely to have higher s verity of violation, all other things 
being equal. In addition, the inclusion of age in the model is motivated by findings in the 
age-crime profiling literature that younger adults are more likely to commit a crime than 
older ones (see e.g. Leung, 1994; Akpalu, 2008).  
 
3.  The Empirical model  
Two empirical models are estimated. The first is a imple logit regression for estimating 
the determinants of the decision to violate. Secondly, due to the limited data on violators 
of the regulation (49 observations), both the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation 
techniques and Maximum Entropy Leuven Estimator (MELE), which is a semi-parametric 
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estimation technique, are used to estimate the equation for the severity of violation (see 
Paris, 2001 for elaborate discussion on MELE). All other things being equal, the more 
investment a fisher makes in the light attraction equipment the more advantage he/she has 
over the fish stock hence the more severe is his/her violation. Therefore, investment in 
light attraction regulation is used loosely as a proxy for the severity of violation of the 
regulation. It must be noted that equations that are empirically estimated are generally 
assumed to be linear. The coefficients are not directly derived from the general 
specification of the supply of violation equation (i.e. equation 5) and only the expected 
signs guide the empirical model. We present the procedures for the Logit regression and 
MELE below.  
 
 
The logit model  
 
Since the dependent variable is binary (i.e. violate the regulation or not) the logit 
regression is specified as follows: 
 
( ) *ln (1 ) ( , , , , ( ); , )i i i i i i i iq q F p E fδ β ε− = Φ • ,     (6) 
 
where iε  is the error term with a logistic distribution, iq is the probability that a fisher i  
violates the regulation andiβ  is the vector of coefficient of all the explanatory variables. 
Since the perceived probability of detection is likely to be endogenous, it is regressed on 
i
E  and its predicted value is used as an instrument. Furthermore, since the perceived 
probability of detection is likely to be endogenous, it is regressed on ownership of the 
fishing vessel, size of the boat and crew size, andits estimated value is used as an 
instrument in the logit regression. In addition, following Akpalu (2008), the perceived 
proportion of fishermen who violate the regulation will be used as an indicator for social 
pressure.  In section 4, we discuss how the data was collected on all the variables of 
interest including the probabilities and the rate of time preference.   
 
Maximum Entropy Leuven Estimator (MELE) 
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The MELE is a semi-parametric estimator that was developed by Paris (2001). The method 
is an extension of the Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) method (see e.g. Golan et 
al., 1996; Paris and Howitt, 1998; Lence and Miler, 1998). The Maximum Entropy 
Estimators belong to a class of estimators that are customarily used in engineering and 
physics. These estimators have been shown to yield low mean square error in small 
samples and to be particularly good at dealing with small samples and/or multicollinear 
regressors in behavioral models. Like the GME the technique involves maximizing an 
entropy function to obtain parameter values of a behavioral model. However, unlike GME 
the MELE does not impose support values on the parameters to be estimated. Since 
estimated parameters are generally very sensitive to the choice of support values, the 
MELE is superior to the GME (Paris, 2001). Like theother Entropy estimators, the MELE 
was motivated by the theory of light in physics. According to the theory the probability 
that a photomultiplier is hit by a photon reflected from a sheet of glass is equal to the 
square of its amplitude. As a result, if the parameter to be estimated in the severity of 
violation equation and for that matter any behavioral model has amplitude or is normalized 
in a dimensionless manner, then the square of the amplitude will define the probability. To 
illustrate this consider a linear regression model f the form  
 
i k iy z uβ= +                         (7) 
 
where iy  is dependent variable (e.g. the replacement cost of the light attraction equipment 
*
il ), z  is the vector of all the explanatory variables (e.g.  ( , , , , ( ))i i i iF E p fδ Φ • , kβ  is the 
associated vector of coefficients and ε  is the error term. 
 
Suppose that a linear relationship exists between the severity of violation and the 






                    (8) 
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A unit-free or amplitude of each k is obtained if each parameter is divided by the square 
root of equation (8) (i.e. 2k k k
k
Lββ β β
 =  
 
∑ ). Paris (2001) then defines the 
probability for each k  as  
2
k k
p Lβ ββ=            (9) 
 
Using equations (7), (8) and (9) as constraints, equation (10) is maximized with respect to 
the three unknowns (i.e. kβ , kpβ  and  iu ). Thus 
 
 
2max ( , , ) ln( ) log( )
k i ii i
i i
H p L u p p L L uβ β β β β β= − − −∑ ∑                 (10) 
s.t.   




pβ ≥  and equation (7) is assumed to be a linear functio. As noted by Paris (2001) 
the term log( )L Lβ β  prevents Lβ  from taking very large values. The General Algebraic 
Modeling System (GAMS) was used for this non-linear optimization program. The 
description of the data and the results are presentd i  the next sections.    
 
4.  Survey design and data description 
The data for the analyses was collected through a survey of fishermen in Elmina in the 
Central Region, Axim and Secondi in the Western Region, and Tema in the greater Accra 
Region of Ghana. A random sample of 118 skippers was interviewed. A questionnaire was 
administered to each of the skippers in a face-to-face interview. Out of this number, only 3 
refused to take part in the survey giving a participation rate of 97%. To guarantee 
anonymity and also gain the confidence of the fisher , an approval was sought from the 
chief fisherman who is highly respected by all the fishermen in each of the districts, before 
the questionnaires were administered to the skippers. Each beach was visited once to 
interact with the fishermen and to establish some trust before the questionnaires were 
administered during the second visit. Moreover the respondents were assured that the data 
was not going to be used against them and also that their responses would be treated with 
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strict confidentiality. Although we also spoke to sme officers of the district fishery 
departments to appreciate the problem, we did not directly involve them in the surveys.    
 
The questionnaire included questions about demographic characteristics (e.g. age of 
skipper, marital status, number of dependents, wealth, membership of credit association 
(i.e. susu group), fishing experience); the types of fishing nets used, length of the fishing 
boat, whether the fisher uses any light attraction equipment or not, the replacement value 
of the light attraction equipment, the size of the fishing crew, the subjective instantaneous 
conditional probability of detection, the expected fine if caught, and a choice based 
experiment similar to that of Akpalu (2008) to compute the individual rate of time 
preference of each skipper. The descriptive statistics of the data is presented in Table 1 in 
the appendix.   
 
To determine the individual discount rate, each respondent was asked to choose one of two 
hypothetical fishery projects. Project A could increase the skipper’s income once by 
US100 at the end of the month in which the data wascollected, and Project B could 
increase it once by US200 in three months’ time4. After the choice was made, the 
respondent was asked to indicate the value for Project B that would make him indifferent 
between the two projects. The instantaneous individual iscount rate is then computed as 
( )2 1logδ α α= , where 2α  is the amount quoted by the skipper, and 1α  is the amount 
Project A offers (US100). The extrapolated mean annu l discount rate was 118%. Such 
high lending and discount rates have been found in Ghana (see Aryeetey,1994 who found 
informal quarterly lending rate of about 25-30%; and Akpalu, 2008 who found an average 
individual discount rate of 131%). As noted by Akpalu (2008) the high rate may result 
from the high rate of default and a high and volatile rate of inflation in Ghana of about 11-
27%.  
 
A five-point Likert-scale ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree was used to 
measure the extent to which the skipper perceived th  fishing regulation to be unfair and to 
protect the stock. As high as 36% strongly agreed that the regulation is unfair and only 
10% completely disagreed. Also regarding the question of whether the regulation is to 
                                                
4 These figures are quite high compared to the average d ily catch of US82 that was reported by the skippers. 
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protect the stock, only 9% of the respondents completely agreed compared to 51% who 
completely disagreed. This observation nevertheless l nds credence to the high rate of 
violation of the regulation. The skipper’s perception of violation rate was measured on a 
continuous scale and about 70% indicated that at least 50% of the fishers violate the 
regulation.  
 
Out of the 115 respondents as high as 50 (43%) indicated that they use the light attraction 
equipment and the rest indicated that they do not have it. The average replacement cost of 
the equipment is US1001 with a very high standard deviation. We followed Akpalu (2008) 
and Hatcher et al. (2000) to communicate in a simple way the question on the perception 
of instantaneous conditional probability of detection to the respondents. The time frame 
for the conditional probability of detection is one y ar and the five-point scale ranges from 
very high (50% or more) to very low (1% or less).5 The mean probability of the violators of 
the regulation is 16% which is about half of non-violators (31%).  Also the perceived 
probability of being fined given detection is much higher for non-violators (17%) than 
violators (10%) of the regulation. These findings (i.e. the negative relationships) are 
consistent with earlier empirical works on supply of violations and consistent with 
expectations from our theoretical model (see e.g. Hatcher and Gordon, 2005; Akpalu, 
2008). These variables were used in the empirical estimations.  
 
5.  Empiral estimations of violation functions 
As indicated in the section on methodology, two equations have been estimated: a logit 
model for the determinants of decision to violate and MELE which is a semi-parametric 
estimation. The results from the two procedures are presented and discussed below. 
 
The logit Estimation 
The dependent variable of the logit model takes the value of 1 if the skipper violates the 
regulation and 0 otherwise. The estimation results are presented in Table 2 in the appendix.  
The pseudo R-squared of 0.45 indicates that the regr ssion line is a good fit. As argued in 
the literature, the probability of detection is likely to be endogenous. As a result, the two-
                                                
5 The five-point scale of the probability is as follows: very high (0.5 or more), high (around 0.25), quite 
possible (around 0.10), moderately low (around 0.05), and very low (0.01 or less).  
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stage-least-square estimation procedure was employed. Thus, the probability of detection 
was regressed on indicators of effort: the boat size, crew size and ownership of the fishing 
gear, and the predicted values were used in the logit re ression. The results presented in 
Table 2 show that increased risk of punishment (i.e. probability of detection) and severity 
of punishment (i.e. expected fine) will discourage violation of the light aggregation 
regulation. Note that the expected fine is significant only at 15% level of significance 
probably as a result of the weak enforcement of the regulation.  
 
Moreover, the effect on the increased risk of punishment on decision to violate is stronger. 
Indeed a 10% increase in the probability of detection will discourage about 13% of the 
violators while the corresponding increase in the penalty will decrease violation by only 
approximately 2%. As the face value it appears thatpolicy makers could discourage 
violation by increasing surveillance rather than setting higher fines. However, since setting 
higher fines are generally costless while increasing e forcement effort is costly, this policy 
prescription is appropriate if the net benefit from increased enforcement exceeds that of 
the increased fine. Moreover, in order to establish the link between surveillance and 
perceived probability of detection, the perceived probability of detection was regressed on 
the number of times a fisher saw enforcement officers at the beach within the last year of 
fishing. In spite of the fact that recall could be poor among fishers who do not keep proper 
records, the simple regression results indicated a positive and significant relationship. 
Indeed on the average a fisher who sees an officer ev ryday would have a probability of 
0.284 higher than the fisher who saw an officer once within the year.        
 
Secondly as found in Akpalu (2008) the individual discount rate is positively related to the 
violation decision and a 10% increase in the discount rate will increase the violation rate 
by approximately 5% (albeit significant only at 10% level of significance). There are 
empirical evidence of positive relationship between l vels of poverty and individual 
discount rate (e.g. see Lawrance, 1991; Holden et al., 1998). As a result, any policy that 
addresses the underlying causes of high discount rate, such as poverty eradication 
programs, are likely to lead to decreased violation and sustainable management of the fish 
stock. On the other hand with regards to the relative values of the discount rates, any 
policy that bridges the gap across the fishers is likely to reduce the severity of violation.     
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Furthermore, the age of the skipper is negatively rlated to and has the highest impact on 
violation with the coefficient being the most highly significant among all the explanatory 
variables (i.e. at 1% level of significance). It is therefore important that the fishery 
management policy and programs target relatively younger fishers.  
 
Results from the Maximum Entropy Leuven Estimator  
Due to the limited number of violators of the regulation and the possibility of high 
multicollinearity among some explanatory variables in the severity of violation equation, 
parametric estimation methods are likely to yield inconsistent estimates. Note that as 
indicated earlier, the replacement cost is used as a proxy for the severity of violation of the 
light attraction equipment. The results of the MELE are presented in Table 3 in the 
appedix. The choice of variables for the estimation is guided by the results from a 
parametric estimation (i.e. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Estimation with robust standard 
errors). The results from the OLS have also been report d in the Table 3 for the purpose of 
comparison.  
 
Except for the coefficient of the age of the skipper and the variable that indicate that the 
regulation is to protect the stock, all the other coefficients are similar in the two 
estimations. In addition, the probability of detection is significant but expected fine is not 
in the MELE, while the reverse is true in the OLS estimated results. Results from the two 
procedures however show a negative relation between th  severity of violation and 
perceived probability of detection and expected fine. This implies that all other things 
being equal, fishers who on the average had higher severity of violation are likely to have 
a lower perception of the probability of detection. Furthermore, from the MELE, a 10% 
increase in individual discount rate will lead to over 12% increase in the severity of 
violation of the regulation. Moreover, the relationship between the proxy for fishing effort 
(i.e. boat) and the severity of violation is positive implying that enforcement effort should 
be directed to bigger boats.   
 
Contrary to the results from the logit regression, with regards to the skippers who violate 
the regulation, the older fishers have higher severity of violation. The descriptive statistics 
show that the average and maximum age of the violators is 37 and 66 years respectively 
which are lower than the corresponding values for non-violators. Consequently, although 
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younger fishers are likely to violate the regulation the older cohorts among these younger 
ones have higher severity of violation. Also, the skippers who indicated that the regulation 
could protect the fish stock, on the average, had higher severity of violation. The 
implication is that fishers who are aware that the fish stock is declining but could be 
protected by the regulation are quickly depleting the stock. As a result, providing 
information about the importance of the regulation t  protect the stock without enforcing 
the regulation could be counterproductive. Since MELE is a semi-parametric estimation 
method, pseudo statistics were obtained from bootstrapping the estimated coefficients. To 
do this, a 150 random data set each with the same nu ber of observations and variables as 
the original data was drawn. For each data set, the MELE was used to obtain the set of 
coefficients from which the standard deviations were computed. Moreover, the plot of the 
actual and fitted values of the severity of violation s presented in Figure 1 in the appendix. 
These plots provide some visual indication of the goodness of fit of the estimation.  
 
6.  Conclusions 
In this study, we investigate the determinants of the decision to violate the light attraction 
regulation and the severity of violation. The theoretical model, which is based on Akpalu 
(2008) shows that individual discount rate and fishing effort among other factors are 
potential determinants of the severity of violation f the light attraction regulation. 
Consequently, the study further strengthens the need to consider these factors in fishery 
management decisions.  
 
From the empirical estimations, it has been found that the individual discount rate is 
positively related to both the violation decision ad the severity of violation, with 
relatively high elasticity coefficients. The high discount rate could be an indication that the 
fishers are credit constrained due to imperfections in the credit market. Any policy that 
addresses such imperfections in the credit market is likely to reduce both the severity of 
violation and also discourage some fishers from violating the regulation.  
 
The risk and severity of punishment are significant in explaining the decision to violate the 
regulation and the severity of violation given that the individual violates the regulation, 
with the risk of punishment having a much stronger effect. The risk of punishment is 
measured by the perceived instantaneous conditional probability of detection and the 
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severity of punishment is measured by the expected fin . Consequently, the fishers could 
be discouraged from violating the regulation or those who violate will decrease the 
severity of violation if enforcement effort and/or the penalty increase. Furthermore, 
younger fishers are more likely to violate the regulation than the older ones, all other 
things being equal. However, among those who violate the regulation, the older ones have 
higher severity of violation of the regulation than the younger ones. Consequently, the 
fishery department should direct more resource to targeting the middle-aged fishers. In 
addition, the extent to which a fisher thinks the regulation is unfair influences his decision 
to violate or not, while for fishers who are in violation, the more they think the regulation 
is to protect the stock, the higher their severity of violation.     
 
Also from both empirical estimations, the fisher’s perceived social pressure, measured by 
his perception of the proportion of the fishers who vi late the regulation, is positively 
related to both the severity of violation and the decision to violate the regulation. Finally 
the size of the fishing boat which is a proxy for fishing effort, is positively related to the 
severity of light attraction regulation. The fishery department should therefore direct 
surveillance to bigger boats.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Estimations  
Variable Mean  SD 
 
Probability of detection 0.247    0.201        
Expected fine 13.643    16.308 
Discount rate 1.180    0.616 
Social pressure 0.594    0.234 
Age of skipper 40.596    10.634 
Education (=1 for at least primary) 0.591    0.494 
Size of boat 39.357    19.077 
Reg. is to protect stock (5=strongly agree, to 1=strongly disagree)  4.063    1.281 
Regulation is unfair (5=strongly agree, to 1=strongly disagree) 2.252    1.345 
Dependents 8.165    4.733 
Belongs to Susu group (=1, and 0 otherwise) 0.278    0.450 
Wealth (100’s) 42.896    99.153 
Ownership 0.461    0.501 
Crew 12.555    6.983 
Violate the regulation (=1, and 0 otherwise) 0.435    0.498 
Replacement cost of light equipment 1001    503.887 
Source: Author’s survey data 2007 
 
 





Coefficient SE  
Elasticity 
 
Predicted probability of detection -9.674 (3.553)*** 1.256 
Expected fine -0.024 (0.017) 0.159 
Discount rate 0.845 (0.470)* 0.530 
Social pressure 3.386 (1.404)** 1.103 
Age of Skipper -0.108 (0.047)*** 2.327 
Education (=1 for at least primary) 0.056 (0.625)  
Regulation is unfair (5=strongly agree, to 1=strongly disagree) 0.848 (0.289)*** 1.044 
Dependents 0.134 (0.072)** 0.580 
Belongs to Susu group (credit association) -1.078 (0.673)  
Wealth 0.002 (0.004)  
Number of observations (99); Pseudo R-Squared          0.45   
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Table 3. Estimated Supply of Violation of Light Attraction Regulation using Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) and Maximum Entropy Leuven Estimator (MELE)  
OLS Estimates 
(Robust SE) 
Bootstrapped Standard Deviations (SD)   
Variable 
Coefficient SE Coefficient     SD  Elasticity 
Probability of detection(a) -1.389    (1.739)     -1.201 (0.494)  0.196 
Expected fine -0.026    (0.007)***     -0.009 (0.037)  0.091 
Discount rate   0.467    (0.174)***       0.935 (0.345)  1.245 
Social pressure   2.239     (0.540)***       2.019 (0.526)  1.393 
Age of Skipper   1.050    (0.490)**       3.103 (0.352)  3.098 
Reg. is to protect stock 
(5=strongly agree, to 
1=strongly disagree)  
  0.080   (0.084)       0.463 (0.187)  1.636 
 
Size of boat    0.017 (0.012)  0.732 
       
       
Constant   10.199    (1.771) ***         
Observations = 48 R-squared = 0.52; 
F(6,41)=9.32*** 
  
Note: The standard deviations were obtained from bootstrap estimates based on 150 replications. ** 
implies significant at 5%; and *** implies significant at 1%. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
(a) the predicted value of the probability of detection was used in the OLS regression and the observe 
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Fig. 1. Actual and Fiitted Values of Severity of Violation
 
 
